Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1991

Utah v. Rowe : Supplemental Submission
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; attorney general; attorney for petitioner.
Shelden R. Carter; Harris, Carter and Harrison; attorneys for respondent.
Recommended Citation
Supplemental Submission, Utah v. Rowe, No. 910165.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3489

This Supplemental Submission is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Ar

'

*

\

BRIEF

{^5.9
(jj,

UJ V v /

DQCKFTNin

B / . P A U L ? AN
/

DAM

- ATTORNEY GENERAL

236 STATE CAPITOL • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 • TELEPHONE: 801-538-1015 •

,/''

JOSEPH E. TESCH
CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF UTAH

June 22, 1992

FILED
Geoffrey J Butler
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State v. Rowe
Sup. Ct. No- 910165

Dear Mr. Butler,
Pursuant to rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the State cites the following as supplemental authority
for the proposition expressed in Petitioner's Opening Brief at 22
n.9 that in analyzing a fourth amendment claim, no separate
procedural issue of "standing" exists; instead, the question of who
has a legitimate expectation of privacy is indistinguishable from
substantive fourth amendment jurisprudence.
California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1630-31 (1988):
Individual States may surely construe their own
constitutions as imposing more stringent constraints on
police conduct than does the Federal Constitution. We
have never intimated, however, that whether or not a
search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment depends on the law of the particular State in
which the search occurs. We have emphasized instead that
the Fourth Amendment analysis must turn on such factors
as 'our societal
understanding that certain areas deserve
the most scrupulous protection from government invasion.
[Citations omitted.] We have already concluded that
society as a whole possesses no such understanding with
regard to garbage left for collection at the side of a
public street. Respondent's argument is no less than a
suggestion that concepts of privacy under the laws of
each State are to determine the reach of the Fourth
Amendment. We do not accept this submission.
(Emphasis in original.) While Greenwood was otherwise cited in the
State's brief, it was not cited for this proposition.

Geoff Butler
Re: State v. Rowe
June 11, 1992
Page Two

Also, in preparing for oral argument, I noticed that some
copies of Petitioner's Opening Brief were missing the last sentence
on page 8.
In case any of the Court's copies of the brief
contained this omission, I have enclosed copies of the correct page
and apologize for the over-sight.
I appreciate your circulation of this letter to the
Court.

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
CFS:jn
Enclosures
cc: Sheldon Carter

the fourth amendment in the third-party home so as to permit a
challenge to the validity of the search warrant.

By doing so,

the majority adopted a "legitimately on the premises" test for
determining whether any constitutionally protected interest of
defendant's had been infringed by the police action.

The

application of such a test for fourth amendment analysis is in
conflict with established law.
The majority of the court of appeals erroneously
concluded that, before a defendant may be found to have abandoned
a constitutionally protected interest in property, the state must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant did not
abandon the property to "avoid self-incrimination."

This

conclusion erroneously applies a subjective analysis to
abandonment and is contrary to the prevailing view.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the court of
appeals' holding which suppressed the evidence seized and
reversed defendant's conviction, and should reinstate and affirm
defendant's conviction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED
THAT THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE WAS APPLICABLE TO
A PROCEDURAL VIOLATION OF THE NIGHTTIME
SEARCH WARRANT PROVISION, UTAH CODE ANN. §
77-23-5 (1990).
In challenging the search warrant for the Swickey home,
defendant never raised an issue of the warrant's substantive
validity.

Instead, defendant limited her argument to the narrow
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